Access to the wireless and radio connections is different from wired networks regarding to the vulnerability of wireless networks. Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) as one of the third-generation cellular telecommunication systems is capable of adjustment to the Global system for Mobile Communications (GSM) and has resolved some of its drawbacks too. Furthermore, UMTS has provided an authentication and key agreement protocol (AKA) namely UMTS AKA that has some disadvantages like as bandwidth usage, huge memory to store data, lack of User Identification security, and synchronization problem. In this paper we investigate an authentication and key agreement protocol named IAP AKA that has resolved a number of problems associated with the security shortcomings of the UMTS AKA protocol. Then, we will represent a new protocol that has applied new procedures for the secrecy of User Identification by preventing general access to user identity. In addition, Elliptic Curve Cryptography is used to strength our protocol security. Finally, the most interesting property of our proposed protocol is Forward Secrecy which is necessary for user conversations confidentiality.
Wireless and mobile telecommunication s y s t e m s e s p e c i a l l y, U n i v e r s a l M o b i l e Telecommunication System (UMTS) have been dramatically increased during recent years. UMTS is one of the third-generation mobile telecommunication standards which is currently entered to the global markets and uses the Global system for Mobile Communications (GSM) framework that has many disadvantages (Harn & Lin, 1995; Lee, Hwang, & Yang, 1999) . It uses the UMTS AKA protocol for the authentication of mobile stations (MS) (Niemi & Nyberg, 2003) that is utilized to eliminate the GSM security problems and confront the recognized attacks.
UMTS Network Security Architecture
T h e c e l l u l a r t h i r d -g e n e r a t i o n telecommunication network UMTS has different parts (Third Generation Partnership Project & Technical Specification Group SA, 2002) that the network components recognizing will help us to plan a security configuration. With regard to the proposed standard characteristics by ETSI (European Telecommunication Standard Institute) about the third-generation security (Third Generation Partnership Project & Technical Specification Group SA;3G Security, 2001), the security architecture is formed with a set of features and security mechanisms. The security feature is a part of service capabilities that states one or more security needs. The security mechanism is a process to use a security feature. Figure 1 shows the placement of security features in five sets each of them is faced specific threats and used for specific security purposes. In this figure, mobile equipment (ME) is a cell phone that along with User Services Identity Module (USIM) provides an access to a third-generation cellular telecommunication network. Access network (AN),. Now, we explain five groups of security structure available in the UMTS architecture (Figure 1 ).
1.
Network Access Security (1): To provide the secure access to the third-generation services (3G) and to prevent the attack to the radio interface link.
2.
Network Domain Security (2): To allow the nods of network operator, to exchange the signaling information securely and to prevent the attack to the wired network.
3.
User Domain Security (3): To secure accessing to the mobile stations 4.
Application Domain Security (4): Application programs available at the user domain that enables a server to exchange information securely.
5.
Visibility and Configurability of Security (5): To inform the user of the current active or inactive security features or enables the user to determine that a service is dependent on which security feature. The security feature of the network accessing is divided to several subgroups that are authentication, secrecy and integrity of the information, authentication and key agreement protocol, a security mechanism for performing the kind of the features set which are responsible for the service of authentication and key agreement. These features are: 1)
User Authentication: this feature means that the serving network (SN) endorses the user identification.
2)
Network Authentication: this feature means the user confirms the serving network is authorized to provide services instead of the home network of the user and guarantees the currency of the authentication too.
3)
Encryption key agreement: this characteristic means that MS and SN are capable of (Shalmany & Rahbar, 2008) proposed a protocol (IAP AKA (Improved AP-AKA)) that was a combination of the mentioned protocols.
Before performing the protocol, every MS user shares one secret key and specific encryption algorithms with its related HN that these algorithms include message authentication code's f 1 , f 2 and key generation's functions f 3 , f 4 . The key K, is named master key that is common between USIM and AuC and never has been transmitted between these two places. The length of this constantly hidden key is 128 bits. Also, the channel between the HN and SN is supposed as a secure cannel. RAND 1 , RAND 2 , RAND 3 are random numbers and ID SN and ID HN are the identifier of the SN and HN, respectively. AMF (Authentication and key Management Field) is the field of the authentication and key management that is used to define the options related to operator during authentication; for instance, using of several authentication algorithms or defining a limitation for the usage of a key. Count is a counter with initial value of zero. When MS is sending an authentication request to the SN, the value of this counter increases one unite. The IAP AKA protocol operation, as seen in figure  2 Actually, the commercial kinds of these false base stations exist that are called IMSI catcher too (Fox, 2002) and has all features of an authorized base station. These false base stations are capable of introducing themselves as an authorized base station and connect to MS. On the other hand, they are able to contact with HN as an MS. IAP AKA protocol is a resistant one to the attack of a false SN or false base station due to use of ID SN in the first step and send it to HN in the next step. Nevertheless, this protocol has some drawbacks inferring as follow. Authentication Vector (AV) is not used in IAP AKA protocol unlike UMTS AKA (Niemi & Nyberg, 2003) . But in E-UMTS AKA protocol despite AV elimination from the protocol, there is a temporary common key between MS and SN being calculated from a private long-term key named K. then, MS is able to calculate the key As a result, the key, K, is used to calculate f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , and f 4 functions because these algorithms are public and their security depends on the key that is used for them. However, IAP AKA has no key for the considered functions.
2)
The CK and IK calculation is possible for the attacker because it has access to the RAND 3 : f 3 , f 4 are the key production functions that in IAP AKA unlike other protocols, no key is used. In the proposed protocol two one-way hash functions, f 1 and f 2 , and four key generation functions (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 ) are used. The first phrase in the parenthesis of the function f is the key of this function and other sentences are phrases that the function f is applied on them.
This protocol assumes that HN saves the former and current IMSI and TID MS of every customer in its database. TID MS is the temporary customer ID which is formed from IMSI and MS received it from HN. HN and MS have a counter, COUNT. Also in this protocol we assume that the G is a group of elliptic curve from first order q, p is a random member of G, and a, b are two random members of Z q . Also we assume that the discrete logarithm of the elliptic curve (Hankerson, Vanstone, & Menezes, 2004) in Z q is a hard problem. As seen in figure 3 the steps of the protocol are as follow: 1) First SN generates the random number of RAND 1 
Proposed Security Analysis
Now we investigate the operation of the authentication and proposed key agreement protocol.
1)
The attack of the false SN: in this protocol because of ID SN using in U MS and sending it to HN that makes it possible for HN to authenticate the SN, the attacker cannot introduce itself as a real SN and connect to MS. Therefore, this protocol is resistant to the false SN attack.
2)
Reply attack: in this attack, the attacker saves the exchanged information related to the previous meeting. The attacker tries to impersonate one of the parties to send the information again. According to the random numbers available in this protocol, there is no possibility for the attacker to plan an attack. For example, U MS is calculated in every stage from a new RAND1 which is sent by SN. Therefore, the attacker cannot send it again and the proposed protocol is resistant to this attack.
3)
Effect of short-term key disclosure: if K TEMP as a temporary and short-term key is compromised, the attacker cannot calculate CK and IK. In order to calculate the session key, attacker should calculate abP. Calculation of abP with aP and bP is difficult regarding to the computational DiffieHellman problem (CDP) on elliptic curve. Therefore, the attacker cannot calculate CK and IK.
4)
Forward secrecy: this feature (Park, Boyd, & Moon, 2000) states that the attacker should not be able to attack the security of the former exchanged information if the private long-term keys for one or some user are disclosed. In this protocol, the attacker can calculate K TEMP using the long-term private key K.But according to computational Diffie-Hellman problem on elliptic curve, calculation of abP with available values of aP and bP is difficult. Therefore, attacker cannot calculate IK and CK keys. As a result, the proposed protocol has the propertyof forward secrecy.
5)
The confidentiality of the user ID: as mentioned earlier, one of the available properties in the security feature for network accessing is the confidentiality of the user ID. In some of the former protocols, IMSI was sent as a plaintext that was in discrepancy with the confidentiality of the user ID. In the proposed protocol, the temporary user ID (TID MS ) is sent instead of IMSI that prevents from its disclosure to the attacker. A main character that the proposed protocol has in comparison with other protocols is the usage of the anonymity key (AK). In this protocol, SN has no access to the temporary user ID and only knows the phrase (nTID MS ⊗ AK). Because of the AK calculation of being possible only through HN and MS, SN has no access to temporary user ID and this condition will increase the confidentiality of the user ID.
6)
Using the public key operations: MS has limitation in battery and computational operation, so none of the former protocols have used the public key; but in this protocol each of the MS and SN run two elliptic curve processes during each running of the protocol. With a rapid technology development, nowadays some solutions completely based on the public key for UMTS have been proposed (Kambourakis, Rouskas, & Gritzalis, 2004 ; USECA Project, 1999). Because of using long-term keys in this protocol, there is no need to use the attestation and two elliptic curve processes during each authentication do not have many calculations for MS. In this section, our proposed protocol is compared with the previous protocols ( Table 1) . UMTS AKA and AP AKA protocols use AV to decrease frequency of access to the HN. However, the usage of AV causes the loss of bandwidth between HN and SN. To solve this problem E-UMTS AKA and proposed protocols use the temporary key instead of AV. In UTMS AKA, HN cannot authenticate MS. While in some other protocols, HN uses the U MS to authenticate MS. In all protocols, MS uses U HN to authenticate the HN.
To calculate U HN and U SN the random numbers are used that entails MS to be sure of U HN and U SN novelty. In the former protocols, the disclosure of the private long-term K key lead to the exposure of the former relations while in the proposed protocol, the disclosure of the K key has no effect on the former relations.
Furthermore, the disclosure of the shortterm keys available at AVs in UMST AKA and AP AKA protocols and also in proposed protocol has no effect on the security of other AVs. On the other hand, in the E-UMTS AKA protocol, the disclosure of the short-term K TEMP key causes the exposure of former relations. Because of disregarding the use of ID SN in UMTS AKA, there is a possibility of false SN attack but in proposed protocol there is no possibility for this attack.
In the former protocols, IMSI is sent as a decrypted text that threatens the confidentiality of the user ID but the secrecy is maintained in the proposed protocol.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have scrutinized some authentication and key agreement protocols in the network environment of the UMTS. First, we examined the IAP AKA protocol that was proposed as a solution to overcome the shortcomings of UMTS AKA protocol and also we showed that this protocol has its own drawbacks; namely, the lack of confidentiality for the user ID and having no forward secrecy feature. Therefore, we proposed a protocol that not only fixes the former problems but also has some new features. The proposed protocol offers a new method for making the confidentiality of user ID that precludes the serving network from accessing to the temporary ID of the user.
